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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
DELTA H. LEWIS,
\
Plaintiff and Appellant,/
- vs.C. A. SAVAGE, KENNETH C.
SAVAGE, C. A. SAVAGE doing
1
business as SAVAGE
AXD. TL\.fBER COMPANY and
SAVAGE COAL AND TIMBER

COAL\

BRIEF OF
APPJ1jLLANT
Appeal No. 8733

CO~fPANY,

Defendant and Respondent·

srrATE~1ENT

OF FACTS

This suit is for per.sonal injuries sustained by plaintiff in a collision between her husband's car, which he·
was ·driving, with the rear end of defendants' truck
standing still between Oak Street and Alemeda Road
on the Main North-South Highway in the City of Alameda in Idaho, at early dawn on August 2nd, 1955. ·
Because of a city ordinance of Alameda, set O:tJt in
the complaint and admitted b~' stipulation to be in force
at the time, against parking trucks on said highway between Oak Street and Alameda Road, defendants amended their Answer at the trial over plaintiff's objection to
evade an admission in the first Answer that they were
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parked at the time of the collision at the forbidden place.

1Ir. Aadnesen for defendants, asked defendant,
J{enneth Savage on the stand, ''In relation to the place
where your truck was parked, was· there any street
lan1ps in the area~" (Our italics) 126 R 3. Kenneth
SaYage sa~'s it was 15 or 20 Ininutes from the time he
first stopped until he felt the impact.
Patroln1an Wharton showed up on the job imnlediately after the accident. Testimony of C. A. Savage.
113 R 1.
\Vharton had seen the truck standing there earlier
that morning. 44 R 16. He did not observe anybody in
J:;oYelnent around the truck. 44 R 2/. A street light
waf' in front close to the truck. 126 R 5.
\Yharton, after fir~t seeing the standing truck, in
orrler for hin1 and the court to fairly estimate the time it
~tood there before the second time he saw it. relates the
thing·s he did. An1ong them talking 15 or 20 minutes to
the sergeant in the station, using the toilet, etc. convinc·
ing that 30 1ninutes would have elapsed from when the
truck fi r~t was seen by Wharton until the collision. 56 R
11.
Lewis sa~·s to Savage at the scene, "And I asked
hhn if he - if he had been asleep, there and he told me
tlw:·' had pulled up to stop and rest a few minutes."
17 R 28. This conversation is not denied by either defendant when on the stand.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

When· Kenneth Savage pulled up there he pushed
his headlights "down on park". 136 R 23. Therefore,
we say the evidence does not just strongl,\' preponderate
that defendants car was "parked". The proof is that it
was parked.
The Alameda City Ordinance governing parking
at night on the main highway where the collision occurred
was partly alleged in the complaint, Ordinance No. 280,
adopted February 20, 1952.
"1.

Unlawful to park any vehicle on Yellowstone Avenue (Highway 91-191) between
one o'clock A.M. and six o'clock A.M. between Oak Street and Alameda Road.''

By stipulation filed of counsel for plaintiff and defendants, it was admitted that this Ordinance was in
existence at the time. ''But by this stipulation the defendants do not in any manner waive any objection to
the application of any ordinance of any nature to the
above entitled matter, nor that the violation of such
ordinance, if any, represented any evidence of negligence.'' Kenneth Wharton testified that the truck was
stopped between Oak Street and Alameda Road on
Yellowstone Highway. 49 R pointing to map. Lewis
s.ays he arrived in Alameda at approximat~ly quarter
to five in the. morning. 11 R 14.
Paragraph 5 of the Complaint is:
''That the main highway upon which defendants
truck was parked, and said .'Xellowstone A venue
(Highway 91-191) are one and the same street,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

and the said truck was parked within the said
City of Alameda."
From the original Answer (before amendmen,t
over objection), ''Defendants admit Paragraphs
1, 2 and 5 and deny paragraphs 3, 4, 6 and 7."
There is no evidence at all in the record that Lewis,
plaintiff, was driving at any rapid or negligent speed.
An~~

evidence about it is to the contrary. ''Did Lewis
tell you, that in his opinion, he was under the speed limit
at that tin1e ~ He said he thought he was not exceeding
the speed limit." (Officer Wharton) 76 R 5. "The
~peed limit was 35 Iniles per hour.'' 76 R 12.
Le"'i~

was moving in the slow lane. Above and
do~e to, and in front of the truck with lumber lengthening the obstacle, was a street light: n1eeting him just before the collision were the lights of another car, to the
rear of this was the oncoming lights of the "milk truck."
There were no flares out behind the truck, though it
\\'af; on a 1nain arterial highway from Salt Lake City to
Butte, with traffic even at that hour. son1ewhat heavy,
on the n1ain street of two cities. to appearances only
one comparatively large city. with ordinance that forbarle parking where they stopped.
The plaintiff was n1ore ~rieYously injured than the
lt•a rnerl trial judge found. :\s it is not the practice of
appellate courts to assess rlama~es on reversal in
ea~e~ of this ehararter "~e do not specify wherein the
finding does not n1easure up to the undisputed evidence
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of)ife endu:dng injuries.
The defendants were conscious of a dangerous load,
the lumber behind the body of the truck. They had
placed half-way up the load ten inch red flags at each
corner. 123 R 5. They had flares in the truck, 123 R 21.
\Vhen they stopped, they did not put out any flares,
123 R 19. rrhe flares were of the reflector type. 123 R 26.
"The type you sit on a little pedestal". 123 R 28.
''Mr. Aadnesen Q: Now would you describe what
traffic you saw in that period of time when you were
parked?" (We underscore; Mr. Aadnesen 's spoken English is faultless).
A. "There was a few, very few cars went by, but
you don't pay much attention to them because they are
going hr.'' 129 R 21.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. That the District Court erred in dismissing
plaintiff's complaint, no cause of action.
2. That the evidence is insufficient to support the
finding of the Court Number 3 that the plaintiff's husban was operating his vehicle at an excessive rate of
speed in view of the circumstances and failed to keep
a proper lookout for other objects on the highway and
that such negligence was the sole proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injuries and damages and that said finding is erroneous.
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3. That the evidence is insufficient to support the
finding of the Court Number 4 that defendants were
not guilty of any negligence which was a
cau~e oi'

proxim~te

plaintiff's injuries and damages and that said

1.~

Y.ien~

finding is erroneous.
4. The findings and conclusions are insufficient to
support the judgment.
5. The District Court inproperly failed and refused
to make findings of fact on all material issues, as follows:

11

(a) As to the existence of Alemeda City Ordinance No. 280;
(b) As to the applicability of said ordinance to
defendants' conduct and as to defendants'
violation of it;
(c) As to the issue of defendants' negligence.
6. The District Court improperly failed and refused
to state its conclusions on the forfegoing issues of fact.
I. Plaintiff's (Appellant's) :Motion for a new trial
or in the alternative, for the Court to a1nend findings,
conclusions and to enter a new judgn1ent should have
heen granted.

ARG t ~:\1 ~~NT
The prime, perhaps only serious, question before the
Rupreme Court is \dwther there can be in law two proxiInate causes each attributable to different actors.
In failing to find "Thether or not defendants were
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7
guilt~·

of negligence and in finding one proximate cause
in the acts of Lewis, found we think erroneously, to be
negligent, the learned judge though he had covered the
case sufficiently to compel a judgment in favor of the
defendants. His failure to find anything about the conduct of the defendants, is as convincing as his finding
of fact and conclusion of law to like effect, that he belien~<l in the intervening ~ole cause doctrine. This wa3
followed in t5ome earlier cases. It is not the accepted rule
nowadays.
All ol' the statement of points may be discussed
under two separate arguments, each of which points up
the error committed by the District Court in finding
only one proximate cause. The two phases of arguments
are:
1. The Defendants' Negligence.
2. The Proximate Cause
1. The Defendants' Negligence

The existence of the Alemeda City Ordinance prohibiting parking on the main highway during the night
cannot be denied. It is partially pleaded in the complaint,
and set out in full in the stipulation on file herein. 20 R.
''SECTION I. It shall be unlawful for any motor
vehicle or other vehicles to be parked on the following
streets within the City of Alemeda between the hours of
1 o'clock a.m. and 6 o'clock a.m., to-wit: On Yellowstone
Avenue from Oak Street and North to Alemeda Road".
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As to the violations of this ordinance by the defendants, the ·defendants' answer admitted that the
truck was parked at the time of the collision at the forbidden place.
Courts take Judicial notice of statement of facts
1n prior pleadings in the same case, and they are evidence against parties making them. 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Section 86, Page 104; Johnson vs. Butte & Superior Copper Co., 41 Mont. 158, 108 Pac., 1057.
Though by amendment admittances are changed to
denials, the statement in any pleading in the same case
in code states are probative and remain matters of Judicial Notice. 20 Am J ur ., Evidence, Section 86, Page
104.
Like,vise, counsel for the defendants referred to
the defendants as being parked. 126 R 3.
"The term "parking'' as applied to autmnobile3,
include~ not only the voluntary act of leaving a car on
the street unattended, but also the stopping of a car on
a highway. though occupied and attended, for a length
of time inconsistent with a reasonable use of the street
for the purpose of travel, but does not generally inclued stopping at the curb for the purpose of taking in,
or letting out, persons, or for the purpose of loading or
unloading good.5. ·' 5 An1. Jur., Automobiles, Sec. 334,
P. ()R2.

One of the defendants testified that it was 15 or 20
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minutes from the time the truck was first stopped until
the impact was first felt. 126 R. 3. Patrolman Wharton
testified as to all of the things he did from the ti1ne he
first observed the truck stopped until the tin1e he was
notified the accident had occured. These facts are related in the findings of fact, and are found at page 56 of
the record. He estimated that 30 minutes had elapsed.
56 R. 17.
The accumulation of uncontradicted evidence here
amounts to proof: (a) That the defendants were guilty
of breach of the ordinance, and reasonable men cannot
differ on that. The evidence is so strong (b) That the
defendant were guilty of common law negligence, that
plaintiff has not had a full fair trial until there is a
finding on that question.
As to (a) we submit that a negative finding if it had
been made would be set aside by this Court without hesitation on a reading of the testimony.
As to (b) after consideration of the evidence, we
believe a negative finding if it had been made, would be
held erroneous, and in view of the uncontradicted evidence, exceeding even the wide discretion of the trial
presiding judge.
This Court knows that it did not take more than
3 or 4 minutes to tighten four chains and kick the tires
(if that happened; they said nothing to Lewis about
that, dum fervet opus).
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The sanctity accorded the verdict of a jury on conflicting evidence is not present here. We submit that
this record is such that this Court can judge the weight
of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses as well
a:' the presiding judge who saw and heard them. We
...;nhmit, that when the Court has read this record there
will he a feeling to a moral certainty and beyond any
reasonable doubt that the defendants were guilty of
negligent breach of the ordinance~ that the evidence
~ternly preponderates, that the:· were guilty of common
la-w negligence, hy parking, or stopping for an unreasonable length of time on a main arterial paved highway,
behind a raised light, without putting out flares, (See
annotation at 111 ALR 1516 as to this failure alone being
negligence) with lumber extending 3 ft. 5 in. behind and
aho ve their small rear lights; when a short distance in
~ig-ht, in front, was a byway on which, if there was any
need to ~top. they could and should have placed their
Yehicle; when they observed cars going h:·: and must
haYe observed car lights 1neeting them which would
blind the vision of drivers of cars overtaking them;
wl1en h:· hanging red flag:' on the rear, they told of
their consciousness that their load was of more than oroinary danger to traffie going in the Saine direction.
(The only extenuating circumstance is that officer
'Yharton when he saw the truck standing there a half
hour before the disaster, and nobody moving around it
~honld havt> 1nade thein moYe on. This in law and, in
faet, i~ no excu::-;e.)
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To find that such conduct was not negligent, we submit would be outside the broad discretion of the trial
judge. \Vhen no finding at all was made about either
plw:-;e of defendants' conduct, the only reason why some
finding was not made was that the earnest learned
judge believed that when he had found one proximate
cau~e, lJj:-; work was finished. It was all called to his
attention by objection and motion to amend and supplement the findings. 26 R.
The Legislature of rtah has recognized that it is
dangerous and negligent to leave occupied or unoccupied
a Yehicle stopped on a public highway when it can be
readily removed for repairs off of traffic lanes. (Out:-id<_. of cities) Section -H-6-101, 1 ~C.\, 1953.
~\nd

that when any load extends 4 feet behind the
hod~· of the truck, at the time of night this disaster occurred a red lantern must be displayed so it will be observed 500 feet behind. (The defendants' load was within 7 inches of breach of statute, 50 R 13, within 7 inches of
negligence per se) by Utah Statute for rural highways
(Idaho Statute is presumed identical)
Section 41-6-128,

r.

C. A., 1953

Under similar statutes it seems to be unanimously
classed by courts also as negligence, not to move off if it
can easily be done.

Merback v. Blanchard (Wyo.) 105 Pac. 2d 272;
Rhoden v. Peoria Creamery Co., 278 Ill. App. 452;
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Watt v. Associated Oil Co. (Ore) 260 Pac. 1012;
Harkins v. __ Somerset Bus Co. (Pa.) 162A 163;
Silvey v. Harm (Cal.) 8 Pac. 2d 570.
The burden of proving that it is not possible to
tnove a disabled vehicle out of traffic lanes is upon him
who stops a motor car in a lane of traffic.
Certainly when many lawmakers have realized the
carelessness of leaving a truck standing in lane of heavy
traffic when a by-way is in sight close in front, intelligent jurors realize the same hazard and when such facts
are not disputed a full fair trial requires the judge to
rnake a finding about it if the case is tried without a
JUry.

The undisputed facts more than preponderate to
the conclusion that the defendants were guilty of negligence and the trial court should have so found.
2.

The Proximate Cause:

The trial Judge made a Finding, Conclusion and
Decree that the negligence of the plaintiff's husband
was the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries and
damages. The trial Court made no Finding concerning
the defendants' negligence, and it is ilnpossible to
tell from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
whether or not the trial Court was holding that the defendants were not negligent in any respect, or whether
the defendants were negligent, but that their negligence
was not a proxi1nate cause of the damage to the plaintiff.
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Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure provides that in non-jury cases the Court find the facts
specially and state separately its conclusion thereon.
A long line of l~tah cases, one of the latest being
Gaddis Investment Company vs. Morrison, (1954), 3· U
(2d) 43, 278 P (2d) 284, holds that failure to make Findings of Fact on all material issues is reversible error
where it is prejudicial. Plaintiff feels that she has not
had her day in Court in view of the trial Court's failure
to make con1plete Findings and Conclusions, and strongly
urges that this failure on the part of the trial Court
alone is reversible error.
A review of the evidence establishes, in plaintiffs
opinion, that there can be no doubt as to the defendants
negligence. rrhis point has been argued fully above.
This heing so, it is apparent as indicated at the outset of the argument herein, that the trial Court must have
felt that there could be only one proximate cause of an
accident. A review of the authorities clearly establishes
that there can be two proximate causes each attributable
to different actors, with recovery being allowed to a
damaged plaintiff against either or both of the actors.
The language of the Court in the case of Kline vs.
Moyer, et al (1937), 325 Pa. 357, 191 A. 43, is pertinent.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in it~ decision
''Without discussing them at length, it is sufficient to note an almost continuous succession of
recent cases in each of which an innocent passeng-
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er in an automobile was allowed to recover for injuries sustained as the result of a collision between the car in which plaintiff was riding and
anoth~ vehicle negligently parked upon the
highway, the recovery being either against the
owner of the standing vehicle, or against both such
owner and the negligent driver of plaintiff's car.
In either ·event these decisions necessarily involved a conclusion that the negligence of the
owner of the parked vehicle was in whole or part
a proximate cause of the accident.''
The Court then cites a series of eases to ::;upport ib
statement.
Further on, the smne Court states,
''We would formulate the general principle as
follows: Where a second actor has become aware
of the existence of a potential danger created by
the negligence of an original tort-feasor, and
thereafter, by an independant act of negligence,
brings about an accident, the first tort-feasor is
relieved of liability, because the condition created
by him was merely a circmnstance of the accident and not its proximate cause. Where, however, the second actor does not become apprised of
such danger until his own negligence, added to
.that of the existing perilous condition, has made
the accident inevitable, the negligent acts of the
two tort-feasors are contributing causes and prox. imate factors in the happening of the accident
and impose liability upon both of the guilty
parties''.
, This Penns~'lvania decision is also found at 111 A.
L. R . .fOG, and is followed by an annotation at page -U2
where there is collected a number of eases frmn · dif-
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with head-lights burning were approaching him from
the left front and he swung over to the right to the outside lane £or ''slow'' traffic. He was driving at a moderate rateof speed. 11 R., 12 R., 13 R., 14 R.
Judges, Supreine Court and District Court, own, ride
In, drive automobiles. They know that visibility .(excepting dust, rain and fog) is poorest, not at night, but
at dusk and dawn. They have eyes. They know that
bright lights ahead blind drivers until reached and
passed. They know that s1nall stationary lights do not
attract attention so much as when in motion, and when
between the driver's eye and a brighter, bigger light
elevated, they give little, if any notice to an approaching driver. Judges know that in four lane highway.s
the slow lanes are outside.
This Court has recognized for a number of years
that more than one separate act of negligence, even
though they do not happen sin1ultaneously, may be proxjnlate causes of an injury.
Hillyard vs. Utalz By-Products Company, (1953),
(Utah) 263 P. (2d) 287.

In the Hillyard rase, this Court quotes frmn Professor Bohlen, as follows :
''The earlier of the two wrongdoers, even though
his wrong has merely set the stage on w·hich the
later wrongdoer acts to the plaintiff's injury, is
in most jurisdiction no longer relieved from responsibility n1erely because the later act of the
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other wrongdoer has been a means by which his
own misconduct was made harmful. The test has
come to be whether the later act, which realized
the harmful potentialities of the situation created
by the defendant, was itself foreseeable.''
This Court went on to pronounce its own doctrine,
as follows, (page 291)
''The doctrine enunciated in the above quotations
is based upon the proposition that one cannot excuse himself from liability arising from his negligent acts merely because the later negligence of
another concurs to cause an injury, if the later act
was a legally foreseeable event. This has also frequently been announced as the law by various
courts.
The Hillyard case is also authority for the proposition that "the parking of a vehicle upon the paved or
traveled portion of a highway is generally regarded as
a hazard to traffic thereon''.
rrhe negligence, if any, of plaintiff's husband was
not imputable to her. 59 A. L. R. 153, Annotation, Negligence of One Spouse as Imputed to Other Because of
l\I arital Relationship Itself, supplemented in 110 A. L.
R. 1099, citing the Utah case of Jackson vs. Utah Rapid
Transit Co., (1930) 77 Utah 21, 290 Pac. 970, in support
of the general rule that the negligence of a husband
will not, merely because of the marital relationship, be
imputed to the wife in an action brought to recover for
personal injuries sustained by her. See also 90 A. L.
R. 630, Annotation, Negligence of Driver of Automobile
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as Inipritable to Passenger, supple1nented in 123 A. L. R.
l:i71. The same rule is stated in 5 Am .Jur., Automobiles,
Sec .. 498, p. 784.

The laws 'of Idaho are presumed to be the same as
the laws of Utah, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
and the courts will not take judicial notice of foreign
la-w.

Dickson vs. Mullings, et al, 66 Utah 282, 241 Pac.
840;

United Air Lines Trans. Corp. vs. Industrial
Comm., 107 Utah 52; 151 P (2d) 591;
Whitmore Oxygen Co. vs. Utah State Tax Commsision, 114 Utah 1, 196 P (2d) 976;
Toomer's Estate vs. Union Pac. Ry. Co., (Utah)
239 P (2d) 162 at 171.
The California cases which impute negligence from
one spo1.1se to the other were based on the fact or law
that in California there is community property and that
as the husband would be the owner of half of any recovery he would not be allowed to profit by his own
contributon~ negligence. But this rule does not apply
in the present case because: (1) There is no showing that
Idaho is a community property State: and (2) Such a
rule does not apply even in a cmmnunity property state
when the husband and wife are residents of a place which
does not have eonununity property, such as Montana.
Bruton vs. r illoria, (Cal., 1956) 292 P. (2d) 638. The
proof is that plaintiff and her husband were residents of
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Montana, that the husband owned the car, that plaintiff
had no interest in it nor any control over it.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that the
present status of the law, recognized by this Court, is
that more than one separate act of negligence may be
proximate causes of injuries and damages to an innocent party, with recovery being allowed against either
or both of the actors. Such being the status of the law,
the judgement of the District Court ahould be reversed
and the cause re1nanded with direction to the District
Court to assess damages in plaintiff's favor.
Respectfully Submitted,
CHARLES P. OLSON,
JOHN H. JARDINE,
MAURY, SHONE & SULLIVAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
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